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This paper presents an argument-based logic for reasoning
about allocations of the burden of persuasion. The logic ex-
tends the system of Prakken (2001), which in turn modified
the system of Prakken & Sartor (1996) with the possibility
to distribute the burden of proof over both sides in an argu-
ment game. First the (2001) system is put in the context of
a distinction of three types of proof burdens and it is argued
that the proof burdens of that system are in fact burdens
of persuasion. Then the (2001) system is modified to allow
for defeasible reasoning about allocations of such burdens
within the logic. The usefulness of the resulting system is
illustrated with applications to real legal cases.
1. INTRODUCTION
The allocation of burden of proof is a fundamental aspect
of legal reasoning: not only is it an important aspect of
the regulation of legal procedures, but it often is decisive
in determining the outcome of legal disputes (on the legal
aspects of the burden of proof see [15]). AI & law research
has devoted a lot of attention to the issue of the burden of
proof, providing the first formal analyses of it.
One approach addresses the burden of proof within the-
ories of nonmonotonic reasoning. The basic idea ([14]) is
that the law, by using various techniques—like the sepa-
ration of general rules and their exceptions and the use of
explicit presumptions— distinguishes two classes of propo-
sitions, according to what conditions must be satisfied for
them to be able to justify a legal conclusion: propositions
requiring a logical demonstration from established premises,
and propositions that can be assumed unless the contrary is
logically demonstrated. The first propositions are those for
which the burden of proof is on the party interested in estab-
lishing them, and the latter are those for which the burden
of proof is on the other party. This distinction is then mod-
elled according to nonmonotonic logics (for instance, propo-
sitions which can be assumed unless the contrary is shown
can be represented as negations by failure in extended logic
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
ICAIL ’07 June 4-8, Palo Alto, USA
Copyright 2007 ACM 978-1-59593-680-6/07/0006 ...$5.00.
programs, as justifications of defaults in default logic, and
so on). This approach succeeds in linking the logical struc-
ture of the substantive arguments being exchanged between
the parties and the corresponding allocation of burdens (the
logical machinery for nonmonotonic reasoning automatically
induces an allocation of the burden of proof).
However, as one of us noted in [8], this approach us-
ing a ‘standard’ nonmonotonic logic cannot represent dis-
tributions of the burden of proof over the parties. In such
an approach counterarguments by opponent always succeed
if they cast doubt but with distributed burdens a logic is
needed in which a doubt- raising argument only succeeds if
the one who moves it does not have the burden of proof.
Accordingly, in [8] the logic of [11] was modified to meet
these demands. A purely procedural version was proposed,
with explicit allocations of the burden of proof instead of
implicitly in the logical representation of legal rules.
The present paper aims to extend the resulting system in
two respects. Firstly, [8] does not distinguish between types
of burdens, while the law distinguishes three types, namely,
burden of production, burden of persuasion and tactical bur-
den of proof. In [12] we gave a logical account of these three
types and now we want to put the system of [8] in the context
of that account: we will argue that that system was about
the burden of persuasion. Secondly, in [8] the allocations of
the burden of persuasion are fixed and undisputable while in
actual legal reasoning they are often themselves subject to
dispute. In this paper we want to allow for reasoning about
the burden of persuasion within the logic.
It should be noted that the argument games defined in this
paper are not intended as a model of actual legal dialogue
but as a proof theory for a nonmonotonic logic. We do not
claim that the debates generated by these games adequately
model legal disputes. All we claim is that our games draw
the correct defeasible inferences from a given body of infor-
mation and an associated allocation of the burden of per-
suasion. It remains to be seen how the present logical model
can be integrated with dialogical and procedural models of
legal argument.
In the remainder of this paper first the logical formalism
on which we will build will be introduced (Section 2) and
our analysis in [12] of the legal notions will be summarised
(Section 3). Then the new logic for reasoning about the bur-
den of persuasion will be presented in Section 4 and it will
be applied to some examples in Section 5. Related research
will be discussed in the concluding section.
2. LOGICALPRELIMINARIES: THE INFER-
ENCE SYSTEM (IS)
In the present section we summarise1 our previous work
on which we will build, namely the system introduced in
[11] (let us call it IS, for Inference System). IS is a logic
for defeasible argumentation expressive enough to deal with
contradictory rules, rules with assumptions, inapplicability
statements and priority rules. Information is expressed as a
set of rules in the language of extended logic programming,
which has both negation as failure or weak negation (∼)
and classical, or strong negation (¬). A literal is of the form
P , ¬P , ∼ P or ∼ ¬P (where P is an atomic proposition).
A literal without ∼ is called a strong literal . Each rule is
preceded by a term, its name. Rules are strict, represented
with →, or else defeasible, represented with ⇒. Facts are
written as strict rules with empty antecedents. Conflicts
between arguments are resolved with the help of a partial
preorder on the rules. Accordingly, the input information of
the system is an IS theory TIS = (R,≤), where R is a set of
strict and defeasible rules and ≤ a partial preorder of R.2
Arguments can be formed by chaining rules, ignoring weakly
negated literals in their antecedent. The set of well-formed
arguments of an IS theory T is denoted as ArgsT . It is as-
sumed to be finite throughout this paper. Conflicts between
arguments are decided according to a binary relation of de-
feat among arguments, which is partly induced by rule pri-
orities. When two arguments defeat each other, they weakly
defeat each other, while if one defeats the other but not vice
versa, the one strictly defeats the other.
There are three ways in which an argument Arg2 can de-
feat an argument Arg1. The first is assumption defeat (in
[11] called “undercutting” defeat), which occurs if a rule in
Arg1 contains ∼ L in its body, while Arg2 has a conclu-
sion L (note that ∼ L reads as ‘L cannot be derived’). The
other two forms of defeat are only possible if Arg1 does not
assumption-defeat Arg2. One way is by excluding an argu-
ment, which happens when Arg2 concludes for some rule r
in Arg1 that r is not applicable (formalised as ¬appl(r)).
The other is by rebutting an argument, which happens when
Arg1 and Arg2 contain rules that are in a head-to-head con-
flict and Arg1’s rule has no priority over the conflicting rule
in Arg2 (according to ≤). Note that all these attacks can be
targeted at the final rule or conclusion of an argument but
also at each intermediate rule or conclusion.
Arguments are assigned a dialectical status in terms of
three classes: the ‘winning’ or justified arguments, the ‘los-
ing’ or overruled arguments, and the ‘ties’, i.e., the defen-
sible arguments. The same statuses can also be defined for
propositions: a proposition is justified if there exists a justi-
fied argument for it, and it is defensible if it is not justified
but there exists a defensible argument for it.
Whether an argument is justified can be tested in a so-
called argument game between a proponent and an oppo-
nent for the argument. Proponent starts with an argument
that he wants to prove justified and then each player must
defeat the other player’s previous argument. Moreover, pro-
ponent’s defeating arguments must be such that they strictly
1This summary is essentially taken from [12].
2Subscripts will below be omitted if there is no danger of
confusion. Also, in this paper we slightly rephrase the ter-
minology and notation of [12], which spoke of “ordered the-
ories” and denoted the set of rules by T .
defeat opponent’s arguments, i.e., they may not in turn be
defeated by their targets. Finally, proponent is not allowed
to repeat his arguments. A player wins if the other player
has run out of moves. The initial argument is justified if
the proponent has a winning strategy in this game. Non-
justified arguments are overruled if they are defeated by a
justified argument, otherwise they are defensible. This ar-
gument game is sound and complete with respect to Dung’s
([2]) grounded semantics.
In [11] a version of IS was also defined in which the rule
priorities are not simply given but are expressed as IS rules
and must be defeasibly derived within the system just as any
other conclusion. In Section 4.3.2 we will say more about
this version of IS.
Note that the argument game does not allow backtracking.
In a model of real dialogue this would be a problem since in
real dialogues often alternative attacks are tried. However,
since our argument game is meant as a proof theory, all that
matters is whether proponent has a winning strategy for his
initial argument. This can be verified by searching the game
tree (the tree of all possible games for the initial argument)
and in such a search all relevant attacks will be examined.
To be able to describe the three burdens of proof we must
also explain how the IS logic can be used in the context of
a legal proceeding. The IS logic assumes a static IS the-
ory but in reality it is, of course, created dynamically in
during a proceeding, regulated by some legal procedure. In
this paper we abstract from the details of such procedures
and simply assume that a legal proceeding consists of a se-
quence of stages characterised by different IS theories and
where the parties can move from one stage to another by
adding arguments. A stage then consists of the premises
of all arguments stated at that point. The outcome of a
proceeding is determined by applying the argument game of
IS to the final stage. We also apply the argument game to
intermediate stages, to verify what would be the outcome of
the proceeding if an intermediate stage were the final stage.
3. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In this section we summarise our analysis in [12] of three
types of the burden of proof. A common distinction is that
between the burdens of persuasion and production. The
burden of persuasion specifies which party loses on an issue
if the evidence is balanced. Whether this burden is met is
determined in the final stage of a proceeding, after all evi-
dence is provided. The burden of production specifies which
party has to offer evidence on an issue at different points in
a proceeding. If the burden of production is not met, the is-
sue will be decided as a matter of law against the burdened
party, while if it is met, the issue will be decided regard-
less of the burden. In the law, the two burdens are usually
determined by the ‘operative facts’ for a legal claim, i.e.,
the facts that legally are ordinarily sufficient reasons for the
claim. The law often designates the operative facts with
rule-exception structures. For instance, for manslaughter
the operative facts are that there was a killing and that it
was done with intent, while an exception is that it was done
in self-defence. Therefore, at the start of a criminal proceed-
ing, the prosecution has the burden to produce evidence on
‘killing’ and ‘intent’; if fulfilled, a burden for the defence is
created to produce evidence for ‘self-defence’. For opera-
tive facts the burdens of production and persuasion usually
go together so in our example the prosecution also has the
burden of persuasion for ‘killing’ and ‘intent’. However, for
exceptions things are more complicated. In criminal pro-
ceedings usually the defence only has a burden of production
for an exception while if fulfilled, the prosecution then has
a burden of persuasion against the exception. For instance,
once the defence has produced evidence for ‘self-defence’,
the prosecution has the burden of persuasion that there was
no self-defence. By contrast, in civil cases often the burden
of persuasion holds for an exception also: for instance, in
Dutch and Italian law insanity at the time of accepting an
offer is an exception to the rule that offer and acceptance
create a contract, but if the evidence on insanity is balanced,
the party claiming insanity will lose on that issue.
How can these two notions be analysed in our IS logic?
Because of its inherent procedural nature, the burden of pro-
duction cannot be defined in purely logical terms but the
burden of persuasion can be defined as the task to provide a
justified argument for the issue on which the burden rests.
(Though we will refine this below.) Proof standards can be
formalised by a careful definition of the rebuttal relation be-
tween arguments: a stronger argument should strictly rebut
a weaker argument only if the degree to which it is stronger
satisfies the applicable proof standard; otherwise both argu-
ments should rebut each other.
Besides the burdens of production and persuasion there
also is the tactical burden of proof . It is not allocated by
law but induced by the defeasible nature of the reasoning
and the estimated quality of the evidence and arguments
produced so far. In the words of [15] this burden is a mat-
ter of tactical evaluation in that a party must assess the
risk of losing on an issue if no further evidence concerning
that issue is produced. Suppose in our example that the
prosecution provided evidence for ‘killing’ and ‘intent’, after
which the defence produced evidence for ‘self-defence’. The
prosecution must now assess the risk of losing if the current
stage were the final stage. If this risk is real then the prose-
cution had better provide counterevidence on ‘self-defence’.
In other words, the prosecution now not only has the bur-
den of persuasion but also a tactical burden with respect to
self-defence. Clearly, a tactical burden can shift between the
parties any number of times during a proceeding, depending
on who would likely win if no more evidence were provided.
However, the exact content of this burden is not the same
for both parties: if one has the burden of persuasion, then
the tactical burden is stronger than if one does not have it
since if the evidence is balanced the one who must persuade
the trier of fact loses.
In our IS logic the tactical burden is automatically cap-
tured by the dialectical asymmetry of the argument game:
the party who has the burden of persuasion is proponent
and therefore has to strictly defeat the other parties’ argu-
ments, while the other party, being the opponent, only has
to weakly defeat the proponent’s argument. This accounts
both for the possibility that the tactical burden shifts be-
tween the parties and for the fact that for one party it is
stronger than for the other.
In sum, at first sight it would seem that the interplay
between the tactical burden and the burden of persuasion
can be directly modelled in the IS system. However, there is
a problem (which in fact is a problem for almost all current
nonmonotonic logics).
In the IS argument game the roles of the parties are fixed
during a game: proponent always has the burden of per-
suasion, i.e., the burden to justify his arguments, while op-
ponent merely has the burden to interfere with proponent’s
arguments by advancing defensible counterarguments. How-
ever, as noted above, in the law the burden of persuasion
can be distributed over the parties. Consider again the is-
sue of accepting an offer while insane: as we said above,
in Dutch and Italian law defendant has not only the bur-
den of production but also the burden of persuasion with
regard to this exception. Suppose now that a defendant ful-
fills her burden of production by providing a written medical
statement, after which the plaintiff provides counterevidence
that casts doubt about whether the statement is authentic.
If the trier of fact is in doubt, i.e., if he is neither con-
vinced that the statement is authentic nor that it is not
authentic, he will have to find for plaintiff. As argued in [8],
this cannot be modelled in a standard argument-based logic
since there counterarguments by opponent always succeed if
they cast doubt: here, however, a logic is need in which a
doubt-raising argument only succeeds if the one who moves
it does not have the burden of persuasion. In [8] the IS logic
was modified to meet these demands. The main aim of the
present paper is to modify this system further to allow for
reasoning about the burden of persuasion.
4. A LOGIC FORREASONINGABOUTTHE
BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In this section we will first briefly summarise the way in
which IS was modified in [8] to allow for distributions of
the burden of persuasion over the parties. Since in the new
system such distributions are fixed and undisputable, we
then further modify the system to model reasoning about
the burden of persuasion within the logic.
4.1 The Litigation Inference System (LIS)
In [8] the IS argument game was extended with the possi-
bility of switching dialectical roles. Let us call the resulting
logical system LIS (Litigation Inference System). The LIS
argument game is between two players, called plaintiff (pi)
and defendant (δ) which at any time can have either propo-
nent role (P ) or opponent role (O), depending on the con-
text. The input of LIS is a LIS theory TLIS = (R,≤, bpi, bδ)
where:
• (R,≤) is an IS theory.
• bpi and bδ are mutually consistent and disjoint subsets
of strong literals occurring in the rules in R.
The sets bpi and bδ contain the burdens of persuasion for
plaintiff and defendant respectively, that is, the propositions
for which they have to act in proponent role.
In the LIS argument game plaintiff starts as proponent
and defendant starts as opponent, but then these roles are
reversed each time the player currently having opponent role
moves an argument for a conclusion for which the sets bpi and
bδ allocate the burden of persuasion to him. The player then
becomes the proponent with regard to that conclusion and
thus he has to strictly defeat the other player’s arguments.
Thus while in IS plaintiff is always proponent and defendant
is always opponent, in LIS the parties of the litigation can
change their dialectical role. LIS thus enables us to represent
distributions of the burden of persuasion over the parties.
4.2 Reasoning About the Burdens of Proof
Though legal systems have general rules and principles
on allocating the burden of proof, they can be vague, open-
textured and conflicting just like in any other area of law,
so sometimes the burden of proof itself becomes the subject
of dispute (see also [7]). In fact, such disputes only con-
cern the burdens of production and persuasion, since as just
explained the tactical burden is automatically induced by
the defeasible nature of the reasoning involved in fulfilling a
burden of persuasion. Since the burden of production is al-
located through rule-exception structures, reasoning about
the burden of production is in fact reasoning about the back-
ing or correct interpretation of rules. In previous work one
of us showed how such debates can be formalised as rea-
soning about the grounds supporting a rule (see [13]). This
leaves the modelling of reasoning about the burden of per-
suasion. Since LIS allows explicit allocations of the burden
of persuasion as an additional parameter of the logic, what
we now need is that these explicit allocations can be derived
within the logic itself.
4.3 The Augmented Litigation Inference Sys-
tem (ALIS)
We now want to modify LIS by letting the contents of
the sets bpi and bδ be the outcome of an argument-based
reasoning process. The resulting system will be called ALIS,
for Augmented Litigation Inference System. To define ALIS
we assume that the language includes a two-place predicate
burden and a naming convention for strong literals of the
language. Formulas of the form burden(p, l) say that player
p has the burden of persuasion for the literal denoted by
the term l. To avoid selfreference, we do not allow that l
is the name of the burden literal in which it occurs. As for
notation, if p is a variable for a player, then the function
expression p denotes the other player and if ϕ is a variable
for a literal, then ϕ denotes the complement of the literal
(the complement of an atom L is ¬L and the complement
of a negated atom ¬L is L).
4.3.1 ALIS with Fixed Priorities
We now first define ALIS for the case with fixed priorities.
In Section 4.3.2 a version with defeasible priorities will be
defined.
Definition 1. An ALIS theory is a pair TALIS = (R,≤),
where R is a set of rules partially ordered by ≤, in a lan-
guage containing the two-place predicate burden and a nam-
ing convention for strong literals of the language. R is also
assumed to contain the following strict rules:
burden(p, l)→ ¬ burden(p, l)
burden(p, l)→ ¬ burden(p, l)
burden(p, l)→ ¬ burden(p, l)
The three strict rules ensure that the burdens of each player
are consistent and that if one player has the burden of per-
suasion for a proposition, the other player does not have it
for the same or complementary proposition.
We now explain the main idea of ALIS. The new argu-
ment game allows any player to explicitly claim any dialec-
tical role, but if a player claims proponent role then he has
the technical obligation to strictly defeat the previous ar-
gument, while if he claims opponent role he runs the risk
of meta-attack on the burden of proof. More precisely, if a
player p claims opponent role, and moreover moves a weakly
defeating argument, then p can attack that argument by ar-
guing that p has the burden of proof. If p can win such a
line of argument then that indicates that p cannot succeed
by taking the opponent role, namely, by weakly defeating: a
party having the burden of proof only succeeds by satisfying
the requirements of the proponent role, namely, by putting
forward justified arguments.
Definition 2 (Dialogue moves). For any ALIS the-
ory T , the setMT of well-formed moves is defined as {pi, δ}×
{P,O} × ArgsT , where the three elements of a move m are
denoted by, respectively:
• pl(m), the player of the move,
• r(m), the dialectical role of the move’s player,
• a(m), the argument moved.
A dialogue on the basis of T is any sequence of well- formed
moves m1, . . . ,mi, . . . such that pl(mi) = pi iff i is odd and
pl(mi) = δ iff i is even.
To define the new argument game, it must be made ex-
plicit at which point an argument defeats another. We say
that A defeats B on ϕ if ϕ is a conclusion of A and A defeats
B since B has assumption or conclusion ϕ or since ϕ says
that a rule in B is excluded.
We can now define the protocol of the new argument
game. (In the definitions below ‘ϕ since S’ denotes an ar-
gument with conclusion ϕ and premises S.)
Definition 3 (Protocol with fixed priorities).
A well-formed move mi is legal in a finite dialogue d =
m1, . . . ,mi−1 iff it satisfies the following constraints:
1. r(m1) = P ;
2. if i > 1 and r(mi) = P then a(mi) was not earlier
moved in d by pl(mi) and;
(a) a(mi) strictly defeats a(mi−1) or
(b) a(mi) = “burden(p, ϕ) since S” where a(mi−1)
weakly defeats a(mi−2) on ϕ;
3. if i > 1 and r(mi) = O then
(a) if pl(mi) = pi and r(mi−1) = O then a(mi) was
not earlier moved in d by pl(mi); and
(b) a(mi) defeats a(mi−1).
As in IS and LIS a player wins a game in ALIS if the other
player has run out of moves and an argument is justified if
proponent has a winning strategy in a game starting with
the argument.
All protocol conditions are taken from the LIS protocol,
except conditions (2b) and (3a). The first of these formalises
the main addition of ALIS to LIS while the rationale of (3a)
is to exclude infinite dialogues where both players keep re-
peating weakly rebutting arguments in opponent role: in
such a case it is plaintiff’s task to argue that defendant has
the burden of proof. The ALIS protocol is also in one re-
spect more liberal than LIS: while in ALIS the players can
freely adopt any role, in LIS a move has proponent role if
its conclusion is in the burdens of the moving player and
otherwise it has the opposite role as its target.
We now prove that ALIS properly extends LIS. By this
we mean that the same justified conclusions that can be
obtained in ALIS can be obtained in LIS by adding an ex-
plicit allocation of the burden of proof to LIS corresponding
to the justified conclusions on the burden of persuasion in
ALIS. To this end we make the allocations of the burden of
persuasion relative to a set of arguments.
Definition 4. Let S be a set of arguments. The literal
sets bSpi and b
S
δ are defined as follows. For any strong literal
L named by term l:
• L ∈ bSpi iff burden(pi, l) is a conclusion of an argument
in S.
• L ∈ bSδ iff burden(δ, l) is a conclusion of an argument
in S.
At first sight this definition allows the burdens of both par-
ties to be overlapping and mutually inconsistent, which is
excluded in LIS. However, the idea is that S is not just
any set of arguments but that it is the set of justified ar-
guments. In that case the desired properties of the burden
sets are guaranteed by the strict rules on proof burdens that
are in T according to Definition 1. We now prove that this
is indeed the case.
Theorem 5. For any ALIS theory (R,≤) it holds that if
S is the set of ALIS-justified arguments of (R,≤) then S is
the set of LIS-justified arguments of the LIS theory (R,≤
, bSpi , b
S
δ ).
Proof. We first prove that we can without loss of gener-
ality consider winning strategies without replies in P role to
moves in P role. If a player replies in P role to a move in P
role then his argument strictly defeats its target. Then any
reply to the same argument moved in O role is a reply to the
argument moved in P role, so in both cases the player can
move the same reply. So if the player has a winning strategy
in one case he also has a winning strategy in the other case.
Consider next any winning ALIS strategy W for pi. We
prove that W can be transformed into a winning LIS strat-
egy. The nontrivial cases are whenW contains pi-moves that
are not legal in LIS. These are implicit role switches adopt-
ing O role (case 1) and burden moves made legal by clause
(2b) of Definition 3 (case 2).
(1) Consider first any implicit role switch mi moved by
pi. Since mi weakly defeats mi−1, δ can repeat (part of)
mi−2 in O role in reply to mi so to win pi must now move an
argument with conclusion burden(δ, l). SinceW is a winning
strategy for pi, we have that l ∈ bSδ so mi is legal in LIS and
mi+1 is not legal in LIS. So in both ALIS and LIS pi can win
by replying to mi−1 with mi.
(2) Consider next any move mi = (pi, P, a) in W made
legal by clause (2b) of Definition 3 where the conclusion of
a is burden(δ, l). Then l ∈ bSδ so mi−1 is not legal in LIS. So
in both ALIS and LIS pi can win by replying to mi−3 with
mi−2.
4.3.2 ALIS with Defeasible Priorities
The IS system as defined in [12] has two versions: one
in which the rule priorities are fixed and simply given in
addition to the rules and one in which the rule priorities are
defeasible and must be derived within the system. In the
latter version, rule priorities can be reasoned about as any
other legal issue. In [8] the LIS system was only defined for
fixed priorities but we want to define ALIS for both cases.
Therefore we now redefine LIS for the case with defeasible
priorities and then extend it to a new version of ALIS.
We first recall the essentials of IS with defeasible prior-
ities. An IS theory now is just a set R of rules, including
priority rules. To express priority rules a distinguished pred-
icate ≺ is used: r ≺ r′ means that r′ has priority over r. The
dialogue game is adjusted as follows. Firstly, the defeat rela-
tions between arguments are now made relative to priorities.
Proponent’s defeating arguments must now strictly defeat
their target according to the priorities stated in proponent’s
argument. This will be denoted as a-defeat, where a is the
argument moved by proponent. Opponent’s arguments, by
contrast, must now defeat their target taking no priorities
into account. This will be denoted by ∅-defeat. Secondly,
proponent now has an additional option, namely, to move a
priority argument according to which opponent’s last argu-
ment does not defeat its target any more. In other words,
according to proponent’s priority argument opponent’s last
argument is now strictly defeated by its target.
To obtain a version of LIS with defeasible priorities, we
simply omit the ≤ component of LIS theories and add the
mechanism of dialectical role switch to the dialogue game
with defeasible priorities. The ALIS dialogue protocol is
then redefined as follows.
Definition 6 (Protocol with defeasible priorities).
A well-formed move mi is legal in a finite dialogue d =
m1, . . . ,mi−1 iff it satisfies the following constraints:
1. r(m1) = P ;
2. if i > 1 and r(mi) = P then a(mi) was not earlier
moved in d by pl(mi) and
(a) a(mi) strictly a(mi)-defeats a(mi−1) or
(b) ami−2 strictly a(mi)-defeats ami−1 or
(c) a(mi) = “burden(p, ϕ) since S” where a(mi−1)
weakly ∅-defeats a(mi−2) on ϕ;
3. if i > 1 and r(mi) = O then
(a) if pl(mi) = pi and r(mi−1) = O then a(mi) was
not earlier moved in d by pl(mi); and
(b) ami ∅-defeats ami−1 .
Theorem 5 is now reformulated as follows.
Theorem 7. For any ALIS theory R with defeasible pri-
orities it holds that if S is the set of ALIS- justified argu-
ments of R then S is the set of LIS-justified arguments of
the LIS theory with defeasible priorities (R, bSpi , b
S
δ ).
Proof. The proof is the same as for Theorem 5.
5. EXAMPLES
In this section we first illustrate the technical features of
the ALIS formalism with some formal examples and we then
apply it to two actual legal cases. Recall that ALIS (as the
IS system, see Section 2) is not intended to be a model of
actual legal dialogue but a dialectical proof theory for a non-
monotonic logic. We therefore do not claim that the debates
below are adequate models of how debates between the ad-
versaries in a legal dispute could evolve. All we claim is
that our dialogue game draws the correct defeasible infer-
ences from the ALIS theory consisting of all rules and facts
that are listed below.
Below we only list rules and regard it as obvious how they
can be used to build the relevant arguments. Furthermore,
we leave the strict rules of Definition 1 implicit. Apart from
this, in all examples the set R of rules consists of all and
only the listed rules and facts.
5.1 Formal examples
The first example illustrates what happens when only
defensible arguments on the burden of proof can be con-
structed. We write ‘c since {p1, . . . , pn}’ to denote an ar-
gument with conclusion c and premises {p1, . . . , pn}. The
literal argument premises are unconditional default rules.
pi1(P ): q since {p⇒ q, p}
δ1(O): ¬p since {r ⇒ ¬p, r}
pi2(O): p since {s⇒ p, s}
δ2(P ): burden(pi, p) since {t⇒ burden(pi, p), t}
pi3(O): burden(δ,¬p) since {u⇒ burden(δ,¬p), u}
At this point condition (2a) of Definition 6 disallows δ from
repeating δ2 so she loses. At first sight it would seem that
pi has a wining strategy. This would be undesirable, since
it would seem that pi can thus always escape the burden of
persuasion for his main claim. However, this is not the case,
since δ could at δ2 have repeated δ1:
pi1(P ): q since {p⇒ q, p}
δ1(O): ¬p since {r ⇒ ¬p, r}
pi2(O): p since {s⇒ p, s}
δ′2(O): ¬p since {r ⇒ ¬p, r}
pi′3(P ): burden(δ,¬p) since {u⇒ burden(δ,¬p), u}
δ′3(O): burden(pi, p) since {t⇒ burden(pi, p), t}
Note that after δ′2 condition (3b) of Definition 6 disallows
pi from repeating pi2 so pi is forced to start the meta-debate
as proponent. In fact, this is always the case; the proof
of Theorem 5 makes this precise in case 1. The conclusion
that can be drawn from this is that plaintiff by default has
the burden of persuasion for his main claim, unless he can
provide a justified argument why this is otherwise.
We next note that the first moment at which a metadebate
could start is after δ1, since the rules for p and ¬p have
contradictory consequents and no rule priorities are stated.
The dialogue would then develop as after pi′3 above.
Continuing the example, we finally illustrate that debates
about the burden of persuasion can be nested any number
of times. Suppose pi can still reply to δ′3 (in his argument, r1
names u⇒ burden(δ,¬p) and r2 names t⇒ burden(pi, p)):
pi4(P ): r2 ≺ r1 since {v ⇒ r2 ≺ r1, v}
δ4(O): ¬v since {w ⇒ ¬v, w}
pi5(O): v since {x⇒ v, x}
δ5(O): ¬v since {w ⇒ ¬v, w}
pi6(P ): burden(δ,¬v) since {y ⇒ burden(δ,¬v), y}





3 but in the debate about this priority
argument a new issue arises about the burden of proof.
5.2 Ownership of Archaeological Goods (Italy)
Our first example illustrates the interplay between pre-
sumptions and burdens of proof, in both private and pe-
nal law. According to an Italian statute (n. 364 of 1909),
all archaeological items found on the Italian territory be-
come directly inalienable property of the Italian State. How-
ever, this only applies to items found after this statute came
into force, namely, after 1909: the property of archaeologi-
cal items found before 1909 could legitimately be acquired
by private people (the owner of the land where the items
were found and their finder, according to general rules of
the Italian civil code), and their property could be trans-
ferred to others (after 1909 only though inheritance). These
provisions belong to private law, but they have a signifi-
cance for penal law too: by establishing when a good be-
longs to the State they provide a precondition for the ap-
plication of penalties against archaeological theft, namely,
against getting possession of archaeological goods belonging
to the State (as established by legislative decree n. 490 of
1999).
The double significance of this provision has recently emerged
in an Italian case, concerning a certain Mr. L., who had been
found in possession of certain archaeological items. Against
Mr. L. first a penal procedure was started. The central issue
of the criminal process was whether such items belonged to
the State, this being a precondition for condemning Mr. L.
for archaeological theft. In Italian criminal law there are two
approaches with regard to this issue, both approaches be-
ing supported by conflicting decisions of the Italian Court
of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione). According to one ap-
proach, which was dominant until recently, archaeological
goods are considered to be State property unless the accused
citizen proves to have legitimately acquired their property.
According to the other approach, a citizen can be convicted
for archaeological theft only if prosecution proves that the
items possessed by the citizen belong to the State. Following
the latter approach, however, the citizen has the burden of
justifying his or her possession of such items, which entails
indicating circumstances explaining why he or she, rather
then the State, owns such items. However, once such circum-
stances are indicated, prosecution must convince the judge
that they did not take place (so that the items can indeed
be considered State property), in order to obtain conviction.
Using our conceptualisation we may say that in Italian
criminal law there are the following views on how State own-
ership of archaeological items is to be proved: according to
one view both the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion (that the items possessed do not belong to
the State) falls upon the possessor; according to the sec-
ond view, the burden of production (that the items do not
belong to the State) falls upon the possessor, while the bur-
den of persuasion (that the items belong to the State) falls
upon the State. The penal judge who decided the case of
Mr. L. adopted the second view and acquitted him, on the
basis of the following reasons: (1) L. claimed that the items
had been unearthed before 1909 and consequently privately
appropriated (and transmitted to him through inheritance),
and (2) at the end of the proceedings, “absolute uncertainty
remained concerning the time of the unearthing”.
Let us try to provide a formalisation of the debate in these
criminal proceedings (rather than precisely reproducing the
sequence of the acts of the parties, we shall provide a nar-
rative which emphasises the aspects we want to focus on).
Let us first consider the main argument by prosecution
(pi), viz. that the accused citizen (δ) is an archaeological
thief since δ took possession of the archaeological item (i)
owned by to the state (s). Let us assume that the prosecu-
tion moves in proponent role (P ) as is usually the case in
criminal law, and that therefore it has the burden of persua-
sion with regard to the constitutive elements of the crime.
Prosecution’s argument is based upon two rules: the first
(r1) indicates the conditions constituting the crime of ar-
chaeological theft, the second (r2) states that archaeological
good discovered in the Italian territory belong to the state.
pi1(P )
r1: ArchaeologicalItem(x) ∧ PossessedBy(x, y) ∧
OwnedBy(x, s) ∧ y 6= s
⇒ CommitsArchaeologicalTheft(y)




f3: → PossessedBy(i, δ)
Let us assume that there is incontestable evidence for the
facts that i is an archaeological item (f1), found in the Ital-
ian territory (f2), and that δ possesses i (f3), so that they
can be taken by the parties as indisputable facts, rather than
as disputable hypotheses (as expressed by prefixing them
with the connective → , rather then with ⇒ ).
The accused citizen δ challenges prosecution’s argument
by affirming that the archaeological item he possesses was
privately appropriated before 1909 (PrivateBefore1909), so
that rule r2 does not apply to the finding of i (not being in
force yet when it took place). He does that playing the
opponent’s role:
δ1(O)
r3: PrivateBefore1909(x) ⇒¬ appl(r2, x, s)
d1: ⇒ PrivateBefore1909(i)
Note that the citizen has provided no evidence for private
ownership before 1909: this is a disputable hypothesis, on
which the parties are likely to disagree.
Prosecution replies by providing the presumption that ar-
chaeological items were not private before 1909, a presump-
tion which prevails upon the assertion that the items had
already become private property. In fact the law usually
assumes that conditional presumptions prevail over unsup-
ported negations of their conclusion, though they are strictly
defeated when specific grounds leading to a contradictory
conclusion are provided. This is how the law deals with the
so-called rebuttable legal presumptions (praesumptiones ju-
ris tantum), while nonrebuttable legal presumptions (prae-
sumptiones juris et de jure) cannot be defeated by argu-
ments contradicting their conclusion.
pi2(P )
r4: ArchaeologicalItem(x) ⇒¬ PrivateBefore1909(x)
p1 : Presumption (x) ∧ UnSupportedAssertion(y)
⇒ y ≺ x
f4: → Presumption(p1)
f5: → UnSupportedAssertion(d1)
The citizen could attack this presumption directly (reject-
ing the idea that archaeological goods can be assumed not
to have been privately appropriated before 1909). However,
this move is not the most effective way of replying to pros-
ecution, since Italian judges have upheld this presumption
in various instances, affirming that the possessor of an ar-
chaeological item will lose on this point unless he provides
any justification (any argument) for the private ownership.
Thus δ chooses a subtler reply: he accepts this presumption
but only insofar as it impacts on the burden of production
(only insofar as it concerns the burden of allegazione, as Ital-
ian lawyers call it): the presumption is valid but it become
useless as soon as it is attacked by a defensible argument.
Thus δ needs first to attack the presumption by indicating
some plausible circumstances in which the item could have
become private property. In case this argument were con-
tested (as will actually happen in the continuation of the
dispute) δ will argue that prosecution has the burden to
persuade the Court that the indicated circumstance did not
obtain or could not operate. On the basis of this allocation
of the burden of persuasion, he will argue that since prose-
cution fails to provide persuasion, he must be acquitted.
Here is the first step of this strategy: to defeat the pre-
sumption, δ argues that an ancestor of his (from which he
inherits) acquired ownership by finding the archaeological
item before 1909.
δ2(O)
r5: FoundBefore1909(x) ⇒ PrivateBefore1909(x)
d2: ⇒ FoundBefore1909by(i)
Assume that prosecution does not find any specific argument
supporting the conclusion that the item was found since
1909. However, prosecution rejects the citizen’s statement
concerning the fact that the item was found before 1909, and
affirms that the citizen possessing an archaeological item has
the burden of persuasion with regard to the fact that the
item was private property before 1909.
pi3(P )
d3: ⇒¬ FoundBefore1909(a, i)
r6: ArchaeologicalItem(x)∧ PossessedBy(x, y)
⇒ burden(y, PrivateBefore1909(x))
If this argument were accepted (so that the citizen had the
burden of persuasion with regard to private appropriation
before 1909) then δ would lose the case and be convicted
for archaeological theft. In fact, at this stage δ has not
provided a justified argument (as required for satisfying a
burden of persuasion) that the items were private before
1909 (the precondition of this conclusion, namely finding
i before that date, is the object of conflicting unsupported
claims). Hence the presumption that the archaeological item
were not privately appropriated remains unchallenged.
However, the penal judge (following certain precedents of
the criminal sections of the Court of Cassation) accepted the
following objection to rule r6: according to the principle of
the presumption of innocence an accused person x cannot
have the burden of persuasion with regard to any fact ϕ
which may prevent x’s conviction (PreventsConviction),
like the fact that a found the item before 1909, a fact which
could indeed prevent δ’s conviction. This requirement is
stated in the Italian Constitution, so that it prevails over
civil law presumptions (according to preference rule p2).
δ3(O)
r7: PreventsConviction(ϕ, x) ⇒¬ burden(x, ϕ)
f6 : → PreventsConviction(PrivateBefore1909(i), δ)
p2 : OrdinaryLaw(x) ∧ ConstitutionalLaw(y)
⇒ x ≺ y
f7 : → OrdinaryLaw(r3)
f8 : → ConstitutionalLaw(r7)
On the basis of this procedural argument, the Italian State
lost the criminal case and Mr. L., the owner of the archaeo-
logical item, was acquitted.
Immediately after the end of the criminal proceedings,
the Italian State, s, filed a civil lawsuit against Mr. L., δ,
demanding that a civil court should establish that the ar-
chaeological items possessed by δ were owned by the s, and
consequently order δ to deliver them to the s. This demand
was accepted by the Tribunal of Rome, the Appeal Court
of Rome, and finally the Italian Court of Cassation (Corte
di Cassazione, Sezione Prima Civile, 10 February 2006, De-
cision n. 2995), so that δ, though having won the criminal
proceedings lost the civil ones.
The central argument in the civil proceedings was again
the proof of State ownership. The possessor δ affirmed, as
he had done in the criminal process, that the State s had
the burden of persuading the Court that the archaeological
items i, possessed by δ, had not been privately appropriated
before 1909, on the basis of the fact that the s according to
Italian law has no privileged position over private parties.
However this argument was rejected by the Court, which on
the contrary accepted s’s argument that δ, besides having
the burden of indicating facts which allegedly determined
the private ownership of the item before 1909, also had to
prove (to “provide full demonstration” of) such facts.
Here is how the Court of Cassation states this argument:
The State when affirming the ownership of ar-
chaeological items can use a presumption of State
property. This presumption is supported, be-
sides by what usually happens (id quod plaerunque
accidit), by a “normative normality.” . . . Consequently,
since the citizen provides in opposition an excep-
tional circumstance, capable of defeating the pre-
sumption, he must prove it, . . . giving full demon-
stration that the item was found before 1909.”
In this statement we can distinguish two lines of reasoning.
First a backing is provided for the presumption (r3) that
archaeological items were not privately appropriated before
1909: there is a high statistical probability, Ph, that if the
presumption’s antecedent is true (something is an archeolog-
ical item) also its consequent is true (private appropriation
before 1909 has not taken place). Then it is affirmed that
once a backed civil law presumption is satisfied (namely,
once the antecedent of the presumption has been estab-
lished) there is a burden of persuasion with regard to the
complement of the presumption’s consequent. By combin-
ing these two lines of reasoning an argument is provided why
δ has the burden of proving that the archaeological items
were privately appropriated before 1909:
pi4(P )
b1: CivilPresumption(r) ∧ Ph(cons(r) | ant(r))
⇒ Backed(r)
r8: CivilPresumption(r) ∧ Backed(r) ∧ ant(r)
⇒ burden(x, cons(r))
f9 : → CivilPresumption(r3)
f10 : → Ph(cons(r3) | ant(r3))
Here Ph indicates high statistical probability (likeness) and
cons(r) denotes the complement of cons(r) (the comple-
ment of a strong literal is its strong negation if the literal is
an atom, otherwise it is the atom formed by removing the
strong negation). Since δ could not find a satisfactory reply
to this argument (according to the Court of Cassation) he
lost the case. In fact, δ has the burden of persuasion with re-
gard to the complement of r3’s consequent, namely, private
appropriation before 1909. By failing to provide a justified
argument to this effect, he fails to defeat the presumption
that there was no prior appropriation, so that the judge can
conclude for State property. Note that δ now could not refer
to r7, namely, to the fact that one cannot have the burden to
prove something that could prevent one’s conviction, since
in civil proceedings no conviction is at stake.
This example shows the distinction between burden of
production and burden of persuasion and the role of pre-
sumptions in satisfying such burdens. Both in the criminal
and in the civil proceedings the presumption that there was
no private appropriation before 1909 could be used by the
State to fulfill its burden of production. However, the bur-
den of persuasion is a separate issue, which was approached
differently in the criminal proceedings (according to the so-
called presumption of innocence) and in the civil ones, which
led to different outcomes.
5.3 Individualised Education Programs for Dis-
abled Children (USA)
Our second example, the American case Weast v. Schaf-
fer, 41 IDELR 176 (4th Cir. Md., 2004) directly addresses
the burden of persuasion for a certain proposition, without
taking presumptions into account. The parents of a disabled
child sued their school district to seek reimbursement for pri-
vate school tuition on the grounds that the individualised
education programme (IEP) for their son provided by the
district was inappropriate. The statute governing this issue
(IDEA) is silent on the burden of persuasion. The parents
claimed that the schoo district had the burden of proving
that that the offered IEP was appropriate. A district court
agreed with the parents but in appeal the majority of the
4th US circuit Court of Appeals held that the parents had
the burden of proving that the IEP was inappropriate. The
Supreme Court 546 U.S. (2005) confirmed this decision on
the following grounds. It began with the “ordinary default
rule” that the party seeking in an administrative procedure
has the burden of proof, and it argued that in this case there
was no exception since there was no reason to believe that
the legislator intended otherwise. The Court then rejected
the parents’ arguments to the contrary. Their first argument
was that putting the burden of proof on the school district
will encourage schools to put more resources into preparing
IEPs and preparing their evidence in procedures, which will
ensure free appropriate public education, which is a purpose
of the IDEA. The court, though agreeing that this might be
the case, rejected this argument on the grounds that these ef-
fects will also lead to increased administrative and litigation
costs, while the legislator had repeatedly amended the act
to reduce such costs. A second argument of the parents was
that fairness demands that facts that are peculiarly within
the knowledge of a party must be proven by that party. The
court rejected this argument on the grounds that the IDEA
contains various safeguards and rights for parents to obtain
the relevant information about IEPs.
Our formalisation will combine the substantial debate on
who must pay the parents’ costs for private tuition with
the procedural debate on who has the burden of persuasion.
Since the case law reports do not contain enough informa-
tion to reconstruct the substantial debate, we have to make
our own reconstruction. Below the parents are plaintiff (pi)
and the school district is defendant (δ). Suppose the parents
start in proponent role, arguing that they should be com-
pensated since they were offered a program (i) which was
not appropriate as a IEP.
pi1(P )
r1: OfferedIEP(x, y, z) ∧ ¬ Appropriate(x) ⇒
MustCompensate(y, z)
f1: → OfferedIEP(i, s, p)
d1 ⇒¬ Appropriate(i)
In these rules x, y, z are variables while i, s, p are constants
denoting, respectively, the IEP, the school district and the
parents. This argument concludes that the school must com-
pensate the parents (MustCompensate(s, p)).
The school replies in opponent role with the following ar-
gument for the appropriateness of the offered program.
δ1(O)
r2: Grounds1 ⇒ Appropriate(i)
f2: → Grounds1
The parents think that the school district has the burden
of persuasion that the IEP is appropriate and therefore now
choose opponent role, moving an argument which weakly de-
feats the school district’s argument based on r2 (by denying
the appropriateness of the program).
pi2(O)
r3: Grounds2 ⇒¬ Appropriate(i)
f3: → Grounds2
Note that pi2 weakly ∅-defeats δ1 since r2 and r3 have com-
plementary consequents. The school district disagrees that
it has the burden of persuasion and therefore starts a proce-
dural debate by arguing in proponent role that the parents
have the burden of persuasion with respect to the claim that
the offered IEP scheme is inappropriate (denoted below with
the term ¬ Appropriate(i)). Defendant’s argument is in fact
the Supreme Court’s main argument based on the ordinary
default rule that a party seeking administrative relief on a
certain ground has the burden of proving it.
δ2(P )
r4: SeeksReliefOn(x, ϕ) ⇒ burden(x, ϕ)
f4: → SeeksReliefOn(p,¬Appropriate(i))
The parents try to counter this argument by providing
an argument why in the present case the general alloca-
tion of the burden should be overridden by specific reasons
why burden of persuasion should be on the school. Firstly
they argue that this should be the case since the school has
peculiar access to information on the issue at state (the ap-
propriateness of the offered IEP).
pi3(O)
r5: PeculiarlyWithinKnowledgeOf(x, ϕ) ⇒
¬ Appl(r4, x, ϕ)
r6: PeculiarlyWithinKnowledgeOf(x, ϕ) ⇒
burden(x, ϕ)
d2: ⇒ PeculiarlyWithinKnowledgeOf(s,Appropriate(i))
The antecedent of both r5 and r6 is provided as a default
instead of as a fact, since it is contested on the basis of the
fact that access to information was ensured to the parents
by legislative safeguards, an argument which was accepted
by the Supreme Court. Such an acceptance can be expressed
by including fact f6 in the following argument, which makes
it strictly δ3-defeat pi2.
δ3(P )
r7: AccessSafeguardsFor(x, ϕ) ⇒
¬ PeculiarlyWithinKnowledgeOf(x, ϕ)
f5: → AccessSafeguardsFor(p,Appropriate(i))
f6: → r6 ≺ r7
The parents’ second main argument is a practical value-
based argument, saying that the burden of proof should be
put on the school since doing so has some desirable conse-
quences. The formalisation of such arguments has recently
received considerable attention in the literature. For work
within AI & law see e.g. [9, 5, 6, 1]. Since this topic is not
the central focus of this paper, we adopt the method of [9]
for the pragmatic reason that it was developed within the IS
logic. In this method, first the two arguments on whether
the legislator intended an exception are formalised and then
their conflict is decided as a priority argument on the rela-
tive importance of the values advanced by these arguments.
The parents argue that the reason why rule r4 should not be
applied to the proof of the non-appropriateness of burdens
(r8) and why the burden of persuasion should be put on the
school (r9) is that this makes it likely that the school will
dedicate more resources to IEPs. (Ph B | A indicates that
the stated conditional probability is high, namely, that the
happening of A makes it likely that B happens too).
pi′3(O)
r8: P
h(ResOnIEPs | burden(x,Appropriate(y))) ⇒
¬ Appl(r4, x,¬Appropriate(y))
r9: P
h(ResOnIEPs | burden(x,Appropriate(y))) ⇒
Burdenx,Appropriate(y))
f7: → Ph(ResOnIEPs | burden(s,Appropriate(i)))
The school’s counterargument is based on the idea the rea-
son why the burden of persuasion should be put on the par-
ents is that this will discourage them from starting legal
actions, which leads to lower litigation costs.
δ′3(P )
r10: P
h(LessLitCosts | burden(x,¬Appropriate(y))) ⇒
Burden(x,¬Appropriate(y))
f8: → Ph(LessLitCosts | burden(p,¬Appropriate(i)))
Note that the school’s argument was moved in proponent
role. Therefore, according to Definition 6 the court has to
combine it with a priority argument making his argument
strictly defeat the parents’ argument. In the method of [9]
this can be done by first stating which values are advanced
by the various rules and then stating which value is more
important. The method then contains axioms which imply
the desired priority conclusions. Below, fpe stands for the
value of free appropriate public education while lc stands
for the value of lower litigation and administration costs.
δ′3(P ) (continued)
f9: → Advances(r9, fpe)
f10: → Advances(r10, lc)
The supreme court in fact based its rejection of the par-
ents’ argument on the observation that the legislator had
amended the IDEA various times to reduce the litigation
and administrative costs. This can be formalised as the
reason why the value of lower litigation and administration
costs is more important than the value of free appropriate
public education.
δ′3(P ) (continued)
r10: LegislAmendedForLC(x, y) ⇒ fpe ≺ lc
f11: → LegislAmendedForLC(x, y)
When the court’s rules in δ′3 are combined with the axioms
of [9], an argument results for the conclusion r9 ≺ r10, so




3. To conclude this example, note
that it is based on the ALIS theory consisting of all facts and
rules put forward in the dialogue plus the three strict rules
of Definition 1. The dialogue is in fact a winning strategy
for defendant on the basis of this theory: defendant can win
whether plaintiff chooses for pi3 or for pi
′
3 and plaintiff has
no other choices at any point in the dialogue. It would be
different if the theory also contained a priority argument for
the conclusion r2 ≺ r3: then plaintiff could adopt proponent
role in pi2 and combine this priority argument with main
argument in pi2. However, the text of the Supreme Court
decision does not warrant the inclusion of such a priority
argument in the theory.
We finally illustrate Theorem 7. The set S of justified
arguments of the ALIS theory includes δ2 but not pi3 or




δ ) is such that
bSpi = {¬Appropriate(i)} while bSδ = ∅.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an argument-based logic
in which distributions of the burden of persuasion over par-
ties in a dispute can be explicitly represented and reasoned
about. The logic extends the one of [8], in which distribu-
tions of the burden of persuasion can be expressed but are
fixed and undisputable. That logic modified the dialectical
proof theory of our system of [11]. While in the 1996 system
one side always has the burden to justify and the other side
merely the burden to interfere, in the 2001 version this may
be different for different subissues of an issue.
Our current system retains from the 2001 system the lack
of an extension-based semantics in the style of [2]. As noted
in [8], this raises important questions concerning the ade-
quacy of ‘mainstream’ nonmonotonic logics for representing
legal reasoning. However, this issue is outside the scope of
the present paper.
To our knowledge, ALIS is the first nonmonotonic logic
that models reasoning about the burden of persuasion. Of
course, different ways to model the burden of persuasion will
lead to different ways to model reasoning about it. There is
one other inferential model with much attention for issues
related to burden of proof, viz. the Carneades system of [3].
This system is parametrised by ‘proof standards’, some of
which are defined in detail. In [3] it is not discussed how
the three proof burdens can be expressed in Carneades but
a method for this has in recent joint work been developed
by Gordon, Prakken and Walton in [4].
In [10] a protocol for persuasion dialogue is presented in
which the participants can debate the burden of proof: when
one party challenges a claim of the other party, that party
can challenge the challenge after which a metalevel dialogue
can start about whether the challenged claim or its negation
must be backed with an argument. The aim of this work is
not to model defeasible inference but to model rational nat-
ural dialogue. It is not discussed whether the metadialogues
concern the burden of persuasion or production. We think
they concern the burden of production but this should be
further investigated.
More generally, more research is needed on the integration
of our inferential account of burden of proof with dialogical
and procedural models of legal argument.
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